GRAVITY AND THE RIEMANN HYPOTHESIS: a critical–propositional confrontation with the Theory of Objectivity

This article presents a critical–propositional confrontation between Junze Shi’s Gravity and Riemann Hypothesis and the Theory of Objectivity (TO), with particular attention to gravity, dimensionality, mathematical intelligibility, modal ontology, and cosmological structure. The study argues that Shi’s proposal is especially relevant for dialogue with TO because it operates at the level of ontological architecture rather than merely technical formalism, engaging themes such as the relation between general relativity and quantum mechanics, the role of Euler’s identity and the Riemann hypothesis, the structure of substance, and the deeper organization of reality. The paper examines both compatibilities and tensions between Shi’s speculative framework and the Seven Absolute Truths of the Theory of Objectivity. It develops this confrontation through the categories of boundary, composition, relational observability, phenomenic elements, Inductive Effects, and informational transcendence, while also situating the discussion within the cosmogonic theorem and the cosmological Eras of TO. The article concludes that Shi’s work is not best understood as a finished physical theory, but as a valuable speculative interlocutor that opens a fertile field of dialogue for a modal ontology of gravity, substance, and cosmic origin. This analytical study also incorporates the foundational bibliography of TO, its recent developments, and a broader support bibliography in physics and philosophy. The analysis benefited from ChatGPT’s analytical support. Keywords Theory of Objectivity; gravity; Riemann hypothesis; modal ontology; cosmology; general relativity; quantum mechanics; dimensionality; Euler identity; philosophy of physics; phenomenic elements; inductive effects; informational Euler identity; cosmic origin; ontology of physics