The principle of justice and the categorization of crimes in the criminal law of Russia

The article is devoted to the analysis of the principle of justice in criminal law in Russia in connection with the categorization of crimes (Article 15 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation). The focus is on the contradiction between the material-law definition of justice (part 1 of Article 6 of the Criminal Code) and the broad interpretation of this principle by judicial practice and doctrine, which includes procedural, anthropological, and psychological elements. The relevance is determined by the uncertainty in the content of the principle, conflicts with legality, humanism, and the uniformity of judicial practice, as well as the presence of gaps in the categorization of crimes, leading to judicial arbitrariness. The aim of the research is to formulate an authorial understanding of the essence of the principle of justice, identify systemic obstacles to its implementation, and propose directions for correcting legislation and law enforcement practices. Additionally, the axiological conflict between formal uniformity of sentences and substantive justice is analyzed, along with the relationship between justice and humanism, as well as the shortcomings of the qualifying feature of theft from the clothing/bag of the victim (subparagraph "g" of part 2 of Article 158 of the Criminal Code) as an example of a violation of proportionality. Dogmatic interpretation of the norms of the Criminal Code, analysis of judicial practice, comparative legal method, logical-structural synthesis, and axiological analysis of the conflicts between principles were employed. The novelty of the work lies in substantiating the necessity of a "refutable presumption of justice of punishment" when meeting the criteria of part 1 of Article 6 of the Criminal Code, as well as in proposing a comprehensive approach to overcoming the gap between material, procedural, and psychological components of justice. Three blocks of problems are formulated: normative (absence of lower limits of punishment for categories of crimes, unreasonable intervals of differentiation), law enforcement (template nature of judicial decisions, the priority of resistance to failure over justice), and institutional (legal nihilism, inequality before the law). Specific directions for change are proposed: introduction of a unified step of differentiation (4–5 years) and a lower limit of punishment for each category of crimes; reorientation of higher courts towards encouraging motivated deviations from templates; and fostering a value-based attitude towards justice within the judicial corps. It is concluded that substituting formal legality for justice is unacceptable, that justice should take precedence over uniformity, and mercy over justice in their conflicts, as well as the practical effect of the proposed model: increased predictability, individualization of responsibility, and trust in the judiciary.