The Effect of Cumulative Voting System on Earnings Persistence and Corporate Value

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze whether the adoption of the cumulative voting system has helped to secure accounting transparency and increase corporate value. Research design, data, and methodology: The hypothesis of this study was established based on the literatures that studied the relationship between shareholder protection system, accounting transparency, and corporate value. For empirical analysis, a sampl e of companies that a dopted the c umulative voting system was constructed for companies traded on the Korea Exchange. For comparison, companies with simil ar f irm size a nd c apital structure were used as a corresponding sample. A multiple regression analysis model was adopted for hypothesis testing. Results: First, the earnings persistence of companies that adopted the cumul ative voting s ystem was higher t han that o f companies that d id n ot adopt it. Second, it was found that the corporate value of companies that adopted the cumulative voting system was higher than that of companies that did not adopt the system. Third, it was found that the degree to which the sampl e of companies that adopted the cumulative voting system was refl ected in the corporate val ue was h igher than that of companies that did not adopt the system. Implications: The cumul ative voting s ystem created a structure that secures the independence of the board of directors that can reflect the opinions of minority shareholders, which is its original purpose. In addition, it is evaluated that the cumulative voting system contributes a lot to the practice of transparent management. In particular, securing the independence of the board of d irectors h el ps to make accounting decisions transparent, which can be s een as a h igh earnings p ersistence. In a ddition, i n the capital market, investors seem to value companies that have adopted a cumulative voting system because they value the independence of the board of directors.