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This essay explores structural conditions under which governance has effectively worked in various domains.

April 22, 2026Open Access

The Correction Window: When Governance Worked — and What Made It Possible

Key Points

This essay explores structural conditions under which governance has effectively worked in various domains.
Analyzes historical cases in banking post-2008 crisis, pharmaceutical regulation, and nuclear verification.
Examines specific reforms and frameworks like Basel III, FDA approval processes, and IAEA inspection regimes.
Highlights the impending challenges governing AI compared to previous sectors.
Identifies key elements making enforcement effective: consequences for misrepresentation, halt authority, and independent verification.
Demonstrates that the window for effective correction in AI is closing more rapidly than in other domains.
Suggests that structural conditions vary significantly between sectors and impact governance effectiveness.

Abstract

Under what structural conditions has governance historically worked? Three domains — banking after the 2008 global financial crisis, pharmaceutical regulation, and nuclear verification — reveal three elements that made enforcement real rather than performative: consequences for misrepresentation, halt authority, and independent verification with access. Drawing on the 2003 Uzbekistan correspondent account reform, Basel III stress-testing, FDA approval gates, and the IAEA inspection regime, this essay examines when correction was still possible — and why that window is closing faster for AI than for any previous domain. Essay 7 of the series Beyond Control: Theory of Limits of AI Governance by Oybek Khodjaev (INVEXI LLC, Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Full text: https://okhodjaev.com/essays/the-correction-window/

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