This study examines the Qing’s requisition and the internal conscription of Joseon troops during the Ming Qing War of the 1640s, focusing on their development and changing nature after the Manchu invasion of 1636 1637. It argues that the mobilization of Joseon troops was not merely a military measure, but a complex process shaped by the reconfiguration of Joseon Qing relations, Qing strategic demands, and Joseon’s internal responses. Following the 1637 imperial edict, the Qing’s requisition of Joseon troops became increasingly institutionalized and intensified over time. While early attempts at mobilization were delayed or resisted by Joseon, mounting military pressure and political coercion led to the gradual implementation of troop deployment through internal conscription. With the outbreak of the Jinzhou campaign in 1640, Joseon troops were more fully incorporated into the Qing war effort, shifting from naval to land-based operations in accordance with Qing strategic needs. From 1641 onward, Joseon troops were deployed on a rotational basis and effectively transformed into a standing garrison force. Although their military contribution remained limited due to constraints in scale and operational conditions, they were consistently assigned auxiliary roles within the Qing military structure. At the same time, it would be reductive to interpret their mobilization as purely symbolic or politically driven from the outset. The Qing initially sought to employ Joseon troops for specific military purposes, but the eventual scale and function of their deployment reflected a negotiated outcome between Qing requisition and Joseon resistance. By extending the analysis beyond the Jinzhou campaign, this study also highlights the continued use of Joseon troops during the subsequent defensive phase. Despite reduced troop numbers, they remained engaged in routine military duties, indicating the stabilization of their role within the Qing war system. In sum, the requisition and conscription of Joseon troops in the 1640s should be understood not simply as coerced participation, but as a product of ongoing negotiation between the Qing and Joseon. It reveals how wartime mobilization functioned as a mechanism for restructuring interstate relations in early modern East Asia.
Myung-jae Lee (Tue,) studied this question.