This work presents a formal analysis of constitutional design under asymmetric risk, modeling political systems as dynamical systems subject to centralization drift and potential absorbing-state collapse. The paper introduces the concept of an anti-closure invariant, defined as a structural constraint that prevents the irreversible concentration of coercive power. A control-theoretic framework is developed in which the stability of a political system depends on the ratio between distributed and centralized force capacities. Two classes of risk are distinguished: (1) bounded, distributed local loss, and (2) unbounded, systemic collapse. Under standard assumptions of absorbing states, it is shown that minimizing systemic collapse strictly dominates minimizing local loss. The model is calibrated using quantitative interpretations of early American constitutional thought, particularly the force asymmetry described in Federalist No. 46. A discrete-time dynamical system is defined to capture the evolution of a centralization index under competing forces of drift and distributed resistance. Stability conditions are derived and validated through simulation. Comparative analysis across historical systems (including centralized European states and the early United States) provides empirical grounding. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of distributed resistance is contingent on technological and structural parameters, and may degrade under extreme asymmetry. The results frame constitutional provisions not as normative artifacts but as structural mechanisms for managing failure modes, with particular emphasis on preventing irreversible system closure. This work contributes a unified framework bridging constitutional theory, control systems, and risk analysis, offering a formal lens for evaluating institutional resilience under adversarial conditions.
Son David Bolduc (Sat,) studied this question.