Beyond consumer welfare: responsive priority-setting in the public interest in competition law enforcement

Abstract The enforcement priorities set by competition authorities carry significant socio-economic consequences: their decisions affect market structures, determine what constitutes legitimate business conduct, and influence how economic power and welfare are distributed. Yet, in most jurisdictions, priority-setting remains a largely reactive, insulated process, guided by a narrowly defined consumer welfare standard and disconnected from wider social, economic, and democratic concerns. Consequently, the benefits of enforcement, such as correcting market failures or enhancing consumer savings, are often unevenly distributed among members of society, and without specific accountability to the broader public. This issue is particularly pressing today, in a turbulent world shaped by geopolitics, geoeconomics, the politicisation of competition law and regulation, and growing pressure to deliver rapid and efficient results. By relying on insights from the theory of responsive regulation, social accountability of independent regulatory authorities, and deliberative and participatory governance models, the paper investigates how priority-setting can be theoretically rethought and practically restructured to be more responsive, strategic, and socially accountable to broader concerns. Our proposed approach remains within the scope of competition authorities’ administrative discretion and does not entail changes to the current substantive, procedural, or institutional frameworks.