Descartes’ cogito ergo sum emerges as an answer to an epistemological crisis: the search for an indubitable foundation in a world vulnerable to error, dreaming, and deception. In the contemporary landscape, however, cognitive activities once experienced as “internal” (reasoning, planning, remembering, writing) are increasingly delegated to artificial intelligence systems. This paper asks whether the Cartesian foundation retains its force under conditions of cognitive delegation, and whether the erosion of first-person thinking threatens the very status of the subject as res cogitans. I argue that the paradox dissolves once we distinguish (i) the epistemic function of the cogito (certainty through self-presence) from (ii) an ontological thesis that would make existence depend on the continuous exercise of thought. Building on a three-level taxonomy of delegation (instrumental support, deliberative suggestion, and agential substitution), a thought experiment involving “total delegation” shows that delegation presupposes minimal acts of intention and assent, while the hypothetical disappearance of conscious thinking undermines certainty rather than existence. The paper then introduces the notion of Cartesian AI to explain why contemporary systems generate the widespread illusion that machines think: by operationalizing a post-Cartesian conception of reason as computation (ratio sine sensu), AI can reproduce the external markers of rational discourse while lacking the first-person self-relation that grounds the cogito. The conclusion is that AI does not refute Descartes but destabilizes the cultural meaning of thinking, shifting attention from metaphysical existence to the normative stakes of agency, authorship, and responsibility.
Giuseppe Pernagallo (Mon,) studied this question.