Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) are increasingly deployed in defense, security, and critical infrastructure missions where reliable communications and navigation are essential for operational effectiveness. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the convergence of cyber threats and electronic warfare against UAS and to develop a comparative security framework for improving communication resilience in defense-relevant operating environments. The study makes three explicit contributions: it constructs a structured threat taxonomy aligned with the cyber-electromagnetic threat space; it introduces an operationalized comparative assessment procedure using a five-criterion weighted scoring matrix; and it proposes a formalized state-based resilience framework with explicit indicator-driven transition thresholds. The research applies a theoretical-analytical and comparative method based on a synthesis of peer-reviewed literature, with primary applicability to small-to-medium tactical UAS relying on MAVLink-based communication in resource-constrained embedded environments. Key threats are categorized and examined, including man-in-the-middle attacks, command and code injection, denial-of-service operations, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing, and radio-frequency (RF) jamming. Security postures are compared across five criteria using an explicit five-point scoring scale and criterion weights. The weighted composite scores indicate that adaptive and risk-informed approaches (3.65/5.00) show structurally stronger analytic alignment with hybrid threat conditions than layered defense models (2.90/5.00) or static architectures (2.20/5.00) within the defined framework. The major conclusion is that UAS communication security benefits from resilience-driven and adaptive design principles supported by structured comparative assessment and formalized state-transition logic, providing a practical basis for future implementation planning and policy development in contested electromagnetic and cyber environments.
Donev et al. (Fri,) studied this question.