This study introduces both dynamic and static reward-penalty mechanisms implemented by the government, and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery suppliers, and vehicle manufacturers to explore green collaborative innovation behavior of core enterprises in the new energy vehicle supply chain. It further analyzes how the proportion of suppliers' R&D costs shared by manufacturers, free-riding gains, and innovation risks affect the strategic choices of the game participants. The research findings reveal that: ① When the difference between the benefits obtained from collaborative innovation and the payoffs from free-riding for battery suppliers and vehicle manufacturers is greater than the corresponding costs borne by each party, the optimal and stable equilibrium state can be effectively achieved. This equilibrium state is specifically manifested as follows: the government implements loose regulatory policies, and both battery suppliers and vehicle manufacturers choose to engage in green collaborative innovation strategies. ② Under the static reward-penalty mechanism, the higher the proportion of R&D costs shared by vehicle manufacturers, the stronger the willingness of battery suppliers to engage in green collaborative innovation. Conversely, increases in free-riding payoffs as well as higher levels of innovation risk tend to inhibit collaborative innovation behavior between battery suppliers and vehicle manufacturers. In addition, government reward and penalty measures can promote green collaborative innovation between the two parties. These findings highlight the critical role of economic incentives and risk mitigation in fostering cooperative innovation behavior. ③ Under the dynamic reward-penalty mechanism, the higher the upper limits of the rewards and penalties imposed by the government on battery suppliers, the faster both battery suppliers and vehicle manufacturers converge toward green collaborative innovation strategy. This convergence accelerates as these upper limits increase, demonstrating the effectiveness of adaptive policy instruments in guiding long-term strategic evolution. ④ With the gradual increase of the initial willingness of the government, battery suppliers and vehicle manufacturers to carry out green collaborative innovation, the dynamic reward-penalty mechanism is significantly more effective than the static reward-penalty mechanism in promoting green collaborative innovation. This study provides important theoretical references and practical guidance for green collaborative innovation among supply chain enterprises. It contributes to promoting the development of the new energy vehicle supply chain toward a low-carbon, efficient, intelligent, and sustainable development path, and offers significant implications for industrial upgrading, green transformation as well as the high-quality development of the entire new energy vehicle industry.
Liu et al. (Fri,) studied this question.