Informal constitutional change and the rise of fiscal discipline in Europe: Ripple effects on fundamental social rights

Abstract Following the Euro crisis, several EU member states enacted constitutional amendments to introduce or reinforce fiscal discipline within their constitutions. Comparative scholarship examining this trend has largely focused on formal constitutional change, adopting a narrow understanding of constitutionalization. At the same time, a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of how these constitutional fiscal rules have affected fundamental social rights remains lacking. This article addresses that gap by examining the case of Greece, both independently and in comparison with Italy. I make three central arguments. First, the constitutionalization of fiscal rules continues to exert a long-term influence beyond the immediate context of the Euro crisis. Second, informal constitutional change provides a valuable lens for understanding the advancement of constitutional rules of fiscal discipline and their impact on other constitutional provisions. Third, fiscal discipline rules—whether formally or informally constitutionalized—have a persistent constraining effect on the protection and realization of fundamental social rights.