Articles A Reconsideration of Hegel's “Conceptual Realism”: “Logic” Replacing “Metaphysics”

This paper reexamines the relationship between Hegelian philosophy and metaphysics from the perspective of "conceptual realism," a position proposed by Robert Stern. Recent advocates of conceptual realism tend to support a metaphysical reading of Hegel, according to which his "Logic" is identified with "metaphysics." This paper clarifies that the framework of "Logic" arises from Hegelian idealism and argues that this idealism is compatible with conceptual realism. This compatibility is explored through the idea that the conceptual has no outer boundary, as articulated by Robert Brandom and John McDowell. To develop this argument, the paper investigates the differences between Brandom's and McDowell's views concerning this idea in three stages. First, it reconstructs the divergent orientations of their respective versions of conceptual realism, showing that Brandom's view tends toward holistic idealism, while McDowell's leans toward a form of realism grounded in apperception. Second, it argues that this theoretical divergence is reflected in their interpretations of the "Self-Consciousness" chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly in the differing emphases on the idealism-bearing "I" and the "Self" associated with a realist orientation rooted in immediate knowledge. Third, the discussion returns to the framework of "speculative propositions" in the Phenomenology of Spirit, proposing that the apparent contrast between these perspectives can be understood within a single proposition. On this reading, the mediating "I" accounts for the formal coherence of the predicates, while the "Self" grounded in direct knowledge conveys the content of the subject through subject-object identity. In conclusion, the paper argues that Hegelian idealism, understood as the claim that the conceptual has no outer boundary, ultimately shares its aim with realism grounded in direct knowledge. However, unlike such realism, Hegelian idealism does not remain fixed within a single conceptual content. Instead, it articulates the subject's content through a plurality of formally coherent predicates while continually returning to that content. It is through this inseparable relationship between content and form, and through the self-movement of concepts that expand and contract between world-directed articulation and apperceptive subjectivity, that metaphysical reality becomes dynamically incorporated into the logical structure of Hegel's speculative proposition.