Themed Section: J. F. Fries and the Friesian School Excitable Reason: Fries's Theory of Apperception and Its Method

In undertaking the dual task of inheriting and transcending Kantian philosophy, Jakob Friedrich Fries shares important ground with the speculative mainstream of German classical philosophy-J.G. Fichte, F. W. J . Schelling, and G.W.F. Hegel-while at the same time strongly emphasizing the empirical dimensions of Kantian philosophy and directing sharp criticism against speculative approaches. By placing Anthropology, understood as empirical psychology, at the foundation of philosophical science, Fries's philosophy has often been dismissed as a form of psychologism. In recent years, however, several scholars of Fries have attempted to rebut this charge. In contrast to these defenses, this paper argues that Fries should indeed be regarded as a psychologist. It nevertheless maintains that the positive significance of Fries's philosophy lies precisely in his acceptance of an unavoidable circularity: the attempt to present a theory of cognitive faculties, which form the foundation of experience, through an empirical theory. To substantiate this claim, the paper first examines Fries's theory of cognitive faculties, with particular attention to his distinct concept of "reason." It then clarifies how Fries criticizes Fichte through his theory of apperception, and how this methodological approach draws on John Brown's physiology as a model. On this basis, the paper argues that Fries's psychologism is not a secondary defect but a core element not only of his critique of the speculative mainstream, but also of his conception of philosophical science.