Epistemic Conditions and Ontological Limits of Scientific Objectivity: A Systematic Analysis of Intersubjectivity, Consensus Formation, and Their Implications for the Philosophy of Science

Objectivity is regarded as a central criterion of scientific knowledge. This paper examines the historical transformation of the concept of objectivity from classical ontology through Kant’s transcendental structures to modern empirical scientific practice. Whereas objectivity was originally understood as a relation between cognition and reality, contemporary approaches define it primarily through methodological reproducibility, intersubjective verifiability, and consensus-based discursive stabilization. An analytical engagement with Kant and Heidegger demonstrates that modern functional objectivity, while enabling technical precision and epistemic reliability, necessarily brackets out ontological aspects of being to some extent. The paper argues that this methodological limitation renders epistemic constraints structurally unavoidable and that a conscious reflection on the conditions of measurability is necessary in order to preserve the integrity and explanatory power of scientific research. In this way, the paper contributes to a critical reassessment of the concept of objectivity in contemporary research and to a heightened awareness of the structural limits of empirical science.