The Intersubjective Domain: Intersubjective Conditionality, Take-Up, and Shared Connectability under Finite Conditions

This paper examines the intersubjective domain within the project of Epistemic Reality. Its starting point is the question of how subjective orientation is co-conditioned by the orientations of others without this already entailing consensus, recognition, or shared reality. The central concept is intersubjective conditionality: subjects stand under expectations, references, rules, interpretations, and forms of correction that they must take into account even when they do not agree with them.The paper reconstructs the intersubjective domain through communicability, take-up, shared connectability, and correction. Intersubjectivity does not begin with identical inner worlds, nor only with successful understanding. It begins when a reference can be taken up, answered, contested, shifted, or corrected by others. For individual subjects, intersubjective order is subjectively reconstructible, but not subjectively freely available.The intersubjective domain is thereby distinguished from merely subjective orientation, social consensus, normative recognition, and functional-empirical robustness. It does not first produce the resistance of the world. Rather, it makes orientations, experiences, and references jointly workable among several cognitive systems. Its specific contribution lies in uncovering a shared space of connection and correction in which subjective orientations do not simply merge, but can be continued, strained, and transformed under the conditions of other orientations.The paper thus determines the elementary conditional structure on which later analyses of shared epistemic reality, shared reference spaces, trust, institutionalization, and science can build. It does not present itself as a complete social philosophy or a theory of normative legitimacy, but as an epistemic-architectural grounding of the intersubjective domain under finite conditions.