Costly Signals and Commitment Under Uncertainty: A Behavioral Observation Approach

Abstract This paper presents a behavioral observation approach for assessing commitment risk in early-stage personal relationships. Under severe information asymmetry, most available signals—words, gestures, expressions of interest—are cheap to produce and easy to imitate. Drawing on costly signaling theory, the core proposal is that actions involving genuine personal cost may distinguish commitment intentions from imitations more reliably than verbal statements alone. The approach applies temporal compression: observing what happens when stated commitments must become actual behavior within a short window. Under this pressure, several recurring patterns have been observed, including degradation of polished self-presentation, reframing of boundary conversations, gradual disengagement after strong initial compliance, and the observer's own sunk cost escalation. Preliminary behavioral log data (N=35, eight-week observation) suggest that low word-deed consistency, high conflict frequency, and declining consistency trends are associated with relationship dissolution. These findings are exploratory and subject to substantial limitations, including small sample size, narrow demographics, and self-report bias. The approach is offered as a provisional set of observational tools, presented here as a working document that continues to evolve. Keywords: costly signaling; commitment risk; behavioral observation; temporal compression; sunk cost; information asymmetry JEL Classification: D81, D82, D91