Commitment Under Uncertainty: A Costly Signaling Approach

Abstract Early relationships involve extreme information asymmetry. Most available signals—words, gestures, emotional expressions—are cheap to produce. Costly signaling theory suggests that actions carrying real personal cost might reveal more.This paper outlines a behavioral observation approach built around temporal compression: creating a short window where stated commitments must turn into observable behavior. Under that pressure, several patterns tend to surface. Polished self-presentation frays. Boundary conversations get reframed away from the original issue. Strong early compliance sometimes gives way to gradual disengagement. And the observer’s own sunk costs can start driving the decision. A tiny pilot log (N=35, eight weeks) found that people whose relationships dissolved tended to have lower follow-through and declining consistency trends. That’s just a description of a convenience sample—nothing more. The approach is provisional and keeps changing. Keywords: costly signaling; commitment risk; behavioral observation; temporal compression; sunk cost; information asymmetry JEL Classification: D81, D82, D91