ABSTRACT: The paper examines Mali’s return to military rule after being once praised as a democratization model. While the 2012 coup has been perceived as a hiccup, subsequent coups in 2020 and 2021 plunged Mali into prolonged military presence in the political sphere, making them successful military politicians. The paper explores the enduring influence of the military institution, analyzing its role as both a state institution and a political force through lenses of political settlement and institutional theory. Rather than asserting the supremacy of the military leader, the coups reflect the military’s resilience amid political turbulence, exploiting discontent to maintain control, while unable to offer answers to security and governance concerns. The paper argues that Mali’s extreme democratic consensus failed to address popular grievances, leaving power in the hands of elites unable to build institutions. This shift has allowed the military to rise, not due to an inherent political strength, but as the last institution standing. This paper finally contributes to the understanding of how the most recent coup provides insights into the interplay between institutional resilience and reform within the military institution, offering a new glimpse on a decade-long transformation.
Marc-André Boisvert (Sun,) studied this question.