How do judges in authoritarian regimes express disagreement when open dissent is risky? This article advances a broader view of individual judicial behaviour by analysing dissents, concurrences, and abstentions from hearings as strategies that vary in visibility and confrontation. Drawing on an original dataset of 732 judgments of the Russian Constitutional Court (1992–2021), I examine when judges choose to issue separate opinions or withdraw from participation. Regression analyses show that dissents are less likely in cases involving social rights and in the months surrounding presidential elections, but not parliamentary ones. Over time, dissents decline and concurring opinions become more prominent, while abstentions are more common in political rights cases. These findings suggest that judges adapt their strategies as political constraints tighten, substituting away from voice towards lower-visibility responses. The study contributes to research on judicial behaviour in nondemocracies by introducing abstentions as an indicator of strategic adaptation in authoritarian courts.
Yulia Khalikova (Wed,) studied this question.
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