Abstract The aim of this contribution is to offer evidence for the claim that one of the goals of Albert’s theory of inner sensation as developed in De homine is to explain the semantic content of the singular terms that enter in predicational relationships, by establishing congruence between psychological representations and logical content. For Albert, the affection impressed on the soul by the external thing must satisfy two requirements: first, it must represent the ontological structure of the natural substance, and second it must be capable of accounting for the logical predicability of the terms that make up inferences. Albert needs his theory of sense perception because the intellect cannot apprehend the individual component that is part of the meaning of a term that refers to a natural substance. Therefore, the mental representation of a logical term such as ‘human being’ needs a sensible support. The paper consists of two parts. In the first, based mainly on Albert’s De V universalibus , I characterize what Albert understands by the predicability of a term and examine how, based on this notion, he analyzes singular terms. In the second part, I show how the theory of sensible perception exposed in De homine fulfills the aim of explaining these semantic phenomena by means of Albert’s account of the functioning of the internal senses. In particular, I focus on the sensus communis to explain this process. Finally, to find additional support for my hypothesis, I briefly discuss some relevant passages from Albert’s De anima .
Paloma Hernández-Rubio (Fri,) studied this question.