Most research on evaluation under information asymmetry asks about what is there. This paper turns the question around: when does missing information actually tell you something? It brings together disclosure economics, audit methodology, and intelligence analysis to formalise the Expectation–Absence Detection–Inference model, the EADI model. The model breaks absence-based inference into three stages: forming a defensible expectation, noticing it has been violated, and then the hard part, validating whether that absence really signals low quality. The central claim is a paradox. Defensible expectations improve accuracy when norms are shared. Across institutional boundaries, though, they amplify over-inference. The mechanism is epistemic confidence: the stronger the expectation, the less likely the evaluator checks whether the counterpart actually shares the norm. The sharedness check gets skipped. Validation gets skipped. A false alarm follows. For Taiwanese firms, the EADI framework offers a practical way to read informative absence, without falling into either over-trust or excessive suspicion. Keywords: Informative absence, expectation formation, voluntary disclosure, completeness assertion, information asymmetry
Chris Zhou (Sun,) studied this question.