Abstract Smith's theory of value is typically interpreted as assuming that labor quantities or production costs are established prior to the act of exchange. We reverse this view by arguing that these factors are established through exchange itself, as individuals mutually evaluate the worth of their contributions under conditions of freedom, independence, and equality in their bargaining position. These conditions define Smith's account of exchange in the “early state” of society, where independent hunters must agree on how to evaluate their works. This is more than a conjectural detour. It provides a benchmark for judging exchange in advanced societies, where exchange value estimation also involves profit and rent, while equality is often undermined by monopolies or legal restrictions, but also by structural asymmetries in bargaining power. Here, therefore, natural liberty depends not only on the absence of legal interference; it also requires the “progressive state” of society, where individuals are effectively independent, and bargaining regains the symmetry of the early state. Only then do ordinary prices approximate natural prices, understood essentially not as long-run equilibrium prices, but as standards of fair remuneration. This reading reframes Smith's project, moving beyond the classical-neoclassical dichotomy to reveal a theory of justice in exchange rooted in mutual recognition.
Bee et al. (Mon,) studied this question.