Global Migration Governance: A Rationalist Approach

Abstract This paper investigates why international cooperation for managing global migration remains politically elusive despite its clear economic and demographic benefits. Utilizing a rational choice approach, the authors apply game-theoretic models—specifically the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Stag Hunt—to analyze strategic interactions at both the international and domestic levels. The analysis reveals that at the international level, collective action problems and the temptation to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor policies hinder the formation of a strong multilateral migration regime. Domestically, a "liberal paradox" emerges where politicians and the public often prioritize the short-term psychological benefits of scapegoating immigrants over the long-term economic advantages of open migration policies. To overcome international barriers, states often rely on regional centralization of power or tactical issue linkage. Furthermore, to avoid suboptimal domestic outcomes, political leaders must actively steer debates toward liberal policies to solve the assurance dilemma. The authors conclude that incorporating socio-psychological factors into rational choice models is essential, as the rising fear of globalization continues to fuel nationalist, reactionary politics that undermine economic growth and global cooperation.