In 2014, the United States Department of Education implemented the Gainful Employment (GE) regulations, tying federal financial aid eligibility to program-level performance metrics, such as graduates’ debt-to-earnings ratios and student loan repayment rates. These regulations primarily targeted for-profit institutions, whose graduates typically report poorer labor market outcomes compared to those from nonprofit institutions. This dissertation examined whether the GE rule was associated with changes in the pass rates of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exam among students attending for-profit institutions relative to nonprofit institutions, with data sourced from the National Association of State Boards of Accountancy (2025) and institutional covariates from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System/National Center for Education Statistics (IPEDS/NCES). The analysis implemented an enhanced difference-in-differences framework at the institution–year level (binomial logistic models with year fixed effects and a national pass-rate offset). Findings indicated a differential post-GE decline for for-profit institutions relative to nonprofits in overall CPA outcomes. Section-specific patterns were descriptive due to model convergence constraints. Results were interpreted as associations, given mixed pre-trend diagnostics and the short post-policy window. To contextualize these empirical findings, this dissertation adopted institutional accountability theory as its theoretical framework. This theory suggests that institutions respond strategically to external accountability pressures, often engaging in operational adjustments that may not necessarily enhance educational quality. The observed sector-relative declines are consistent with such strategic responses amid sector instability, underscoring the nuanced interplay between accountability policy, institutional adaptation, and licensure outcomes.
Mansour Farhat (Thu,) studied this question.