This paper fixes qualia within the second system of Kasei-Theory. Qualia are not introduced as subjective essence, inner quality, private experience, raw feel, phenomenal content, what-it-is-like, mental property, sense datum, subjective presence, interiority, consciousness, access, biological substrate, or ontology. Reading does not establish qualia. Time does not establish qualia. Observation does not establish qualia. State does not establish qualia. Field does not establish qualia. Interaction does not establish qualia. Information does not establish qualia. Phase does not establish qualia. Life does not establish qualia. Consciousness does not establish qualia. Configuration does not establish qualia. Qualia are fixed only as the local readability condition under which distributed maintainability is readable as qualia without subjective essence. This readability does not establish subjective essence, inner quality, private experience, raw feel, phenomenal content, what-it-is-like, mental property, sense datum, subjective presence, interiority, consciousness, access, biological substrate, or ontology. The paper prevents qualia from being reduced to inner quality, private experience, raw feel, phenomenal content, what-it-is-like, mental property, sense datum, subjective presence, consciousness, access, biological substrate, or ontological condition. Qualia do not belong to a subject, do not become private experience, do not secure raw feel, do not ground phenomenal content, do not restore interiority after consciousness, and do not establish consciousness. Kasei-Theory does not establish determinism. Fixation is not determination. Constraint is not necessity. Maintainability is not predestination. Non-transition is not modal exclusion. No subjective essence is presupposed. No inner quality is introduced. No private experience is established. No raw feel is restored. No phenomenal content is introduced. No consciousness is secured.
Juza Minamikata (Fri,) studied this question.