This paper defends the thesis that consciousness consists in the capacity to objectify one's own thought—that is, the capacity by which perception reaches thought itself and renders it available as an object. The argument proceeds in three stages. First, it is established that thought and consciousness are distinct: thought can exist as pure activity without becoming an object for the subject who exercises it. Second, the self is shown to be a consequence rather than a precondition of this objectification: the experience of the 'I' emerges simultaneously with and inseparably from the event in which thought first becomes an object. Third, the epistemological status of consciousness is derived from this definition: consciousness is verifiable only in the first person, externally indemonstrable, and collectively recognizable through what the paper terms intersubjective corroboration—the convergence of independent first-person descriptions of the same structural event. The thesis is situated in relation to major philosophical accounts of consciousness, including those of Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl, Sartre, Nagel, Chalmers, Dennett, and higher-order thought theories, noting both structural affinities and substantive divergences. The paper argues that the proposed account is anterior to and more explanatorily parsimonious than its predecessors, in particular because it identifies a determinate origin for the experience of subjectivity rather than presupposing it.
Gabriel Iguiniz Agesta (Sat,) studied this question.