The Solution to the Is-Ought Problem based on Critical Rationalism and Evolutionary Theory

This paper solves the is-ought problem on the basis of critical rationalism, the Quine-Duhem thesis, and Bunge's ontology. It shows that the naturalistic fallacy is a special case of the definist fallacy and provides no general barrier against empirical-naturalistic ethics. This reconstruction avoids the error by reconstructing the normative standard empirically. Existing impossibility proofs for is-ought inferences hold only within specific systems; a general impossibility proof cannot be provided. Systems producing unbridgeable is-ought gaps sever normative statements from reality and are disqualified as candidates for rational ethics. The paper reconstructs “ought” as a goal-relative ophelic operator, identifies lineage fitness as the non-freely chosen teleonomic ultimate goal of living systems empirically reconstructed through evolutionary theory, and demonstrates formally how normative statements follow without normative premises. It provides a solution to the is-ought problem in which assumptions, derivation, and normative consequences are equally open to criticism and testable against experience. Eine Deutsche Version kann hier gefunden werden: https://philpapers.org/rec/DELDLD-13