In recent philosophical discourse, flourishing has emerged as a concept of growing importance-often linked to the field of well-being studies and explored by various and different disciplines. The article approaches flourishing not as an abstract ideal, but rather as a condition that must be understood as rooted in the lived reality of human vulnerability. More specifically, I argue that any genuine account of human flourishing must regard vulnerability- human inherent fragility and reciprocal dependence-not as an impediment, but as the very foundation from which meaningful flourishing can arise. Building on Alasdair MacIntyre's reflections-who observes that this perspective is insufficiently acknowledged in comparison to the prevailing standard of moral philosophy-I understand vulnerability as a fundamental human characteristic arising from the interconnectedness of dependence, rationality, and animality. The second part of the paper engages with phenomenological perspectives in order to establish a dialogue between this tradition and MacIntyre's framework of virtue ethics. The aim is to anchor the concept of a virtuous moral life-implicit in the notion of flourishing-in the lived, embodied experience of the individual. In this light, three fundamental categories intrinsic to human vulnerability are identified as essential compass points for understanding what must be preserved, pursued, and guaranteed even under conditions of extreme fragility. Only by attending to these dimensions-embodiment, co-existence and lived temporality-can ensure that the human environment remains habitable, and thus adequate for a disposition toward flourishing.
Irene Quiliconi (Wed,) studied this question.