ABSTRACT The apparent vagueness of normative predicates such as “permissible,” “wrong,” and “responsible” raises a number of intriguing questions and has prompted a growing body of philosophical literature. In this article, I review recent metaethical discussions on normative vagueness. Specifically, I examine how well different metaethical views can handle moral vagueness. I focus on reviewing recent arguments against the compatibility of robust realism and particular theories of vagueness. Although these arguments turn out not to be decisive, they highlight areas warranting further exploration: The phenomenon of moral vagueness puts pressure on answering important questions about the semantics of moral terms, the “fairness” of morality, supervenience in ethics, and the nature of moral properties. This article also suggests that considerable work remains to be done to assess the compatibility between moral vagueness and antirealist theories, such as noncognitivism, expressivism, and error theory.
Kaj André Zeller (Tue,) studied this question.