This work explores the gap between lived cognitive experience and institutional frameworks used to interpret and classify such experiences, with a particular focus on neurorights, cognitive liberty, and the epistemology of neurotechnology. Rather than treating anomalous or difficult-to-classify cognitive experiences as purely individual or clinical phenomena, the paper examines how existing social, legal, and scientific frameworks may shape what is recognized as valid experience in the first place. The central question is not only how emerging neurotechnologies affect human cognition, but also how institutional systems define the boundaries of what counts as cognition, agency, and normality. This text is intended as a conceptual contribution to ongoing discussions in AI ethics, neuroethics, and science and technology studies (STS), and does not claim empirical generalization but rather aims to articulate a structural tension between experience and recognition.
Tien Huynh (Wed,) studied this question.
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