This paper closes the Theory Arc of Mirror Programme, Volume I: Observerhood by situating Mirror Theory within the broader landscape of cognitive science, philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. It compares Mirror Theory with predictive processing, active inference, autopoiesis, enactivism, global workspace theory, integrated information theory, self-model theory, intentional systems theory, strange-loop accounts and simulation arguments. The paper argues that Mirror Theory should be understood not as a replacement for these frameworks, but as a candidate bridge among them by making observerhood an explicit explanatory target rather than an assumed starting point. The paper clarifies the distinctive contribution of Mirror Theory: recursive observerhood as a derived regime in which a bounded viability-constrained system maintains a world-model, a self-model and reliability-tracking over its own self-model in a way that matters for prediction, correction and continued organisation. This release completes the initial Theory Arc following V01.01 — Mirror Theory I and V01.02 — Mirror Theory II.
Lloyd Christopher Smith (Fri,) studied this question.
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