China and Limits to the European Union's Geoeconomic Turn

Abstract The European Union's (EU) pivot from a commitment to efficiency to concern about security is commonly referred to as its ‘geoeconomic turn’. This paper analyses the EU's capacities to enhance its economic security and to engage in economic statecraft by focusing on China, which, at least until recently, posed the greatest geoeconomic challenge to the EU. It focuses on the two policies central to geoeconomic rivalry with China: export controls on cutting‐edge semiconductors and restrictions on the provision of fifth‐generation (5G) telecommunications infrastructure. Both deal with national security and are the responsibility of the member states. They are, therefore, hard cases for the EU to act as a geoeconomic power. Whilst export controls are an offensive measure intended to constrain Chinese military and technological capabilities, limits on participation in 5G networks are defensive, seeking to restrict China's ability to extract information or disrupt critical infrastructure. Whilst the EU has taken steps to address the risks associated with 5G, the Commission has not made a forceful case for the EU to develop the capacity to adopt unilateral export controls. This paper links the recent literature on the EU's geoeconomic turn to the International Relations literature on ‘securitization’. It also draws a distinction between the processes of securitization, making the case for defensive measures, and geopoliticization, pushing to leverage economic power for geostrategic ends. It argues that whilst the securitization is at play in the EU, geopoliticization is largely absent.