Abstract In this article, I offer a novel critique of Jeremy Waldron’s attempt to reconcile Locke’s skeptical epistemology with his normative theory of e qua lity. I argue that Waldron’s turn to a theologically valent “real resemblance” to ground Lockean e qua lity cannot confer the moral or ontological objectivity he imputes to his Lockean egalitarianism. I identify interpretive issues with Waldron’s turn to John McDowell’s metaethics to explain this resemblance’s theological valence. I highlight instead Locke and McDowell’s shared emphasis on education and our communities in cultivating moral sensibilities. Locke’s education underscored the ethical imperative of cultivating epistemic and social virtues to improve fallible understanding and probabilistic judgments. This pragmatic guidance offered a bridge between our authoritative moral claims and our engagement with others qua e qua ls and everyday conduct in the world. I conclude by locating Locke’s continued relevance in his practical measures for realizing egalitarian commitments despite our fallibility, not his theological premises.
Michelle Chun (Wed,) studied this question.