Deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) continues to expand rapidly across a wide range of applications, including environmental monitoring, military surveillance, precision agriculture, and disaster response. Despite their increasing ubiquity, UAVs remain inherently vulnerable to security threats due to resource-constrained hardware, energy limitations, and reliance on open wireless communication channels. These factors render traditional cryptographic solutions impractical, thereby necessitating the development of lightweight, UAV-specific security mechanisms. This review presents a comprehensive analysis of lightweight encryption techniques and key management strategies designed for energy-efficient and secure UAV communication. Special emphasis is placed on recent cryptographic advancements, including the adoption of the ASCON family of ciphers and the emergence of post-quantum algorithms that can secure UAV networks against future quantum threats. Key management techniques such as blockchain-based decentralized key exchange, Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-based authentication, and hierarchical clustering schemes are evaluated for their performance and scalability. To ensure comprehensive protection, this review introduces a multilayer security framework addressing vulnerabilities from the physical to the application layer. Comparative analysis of lightweight cryptographic algorithms and multiple key distribution approaches is conducted based on energy consumption, latency, memory usage, and deployment feasibility in dynamic aerial environments. Our review also identifies key research challenges, including secure and efficient rekeying during flight, resilience to cross-layer attacks, and the need for standardized frameworks supporting post-quantum cryptography in UAV swarms. By synthesizing current advancements and highlighting research gaps, this study aims to provide a foundation for future secure communication architectures tailored to the unique operational constraints of UAV networks.
Sarkar et al. (Thu,) studied this question.