Collective Amnesia as an Epistemic Injustice

Abstract By considering real-life cases of epistemic reparations (Lackey 2022), such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Canada, I identify and characterize a form of epistemic injustice that I call “collective amnesia.” I distinguish this phenomenon from other recognized forms of epistemic injustice and argue that collective amnesia specifically leads to primary and secondary epistemic harms in the form of distorted representations of a community’s past, preventing an even broader epistemic community from gaining adequate knowledge of its past and present identities. More precisely, I argue that collective amnesia arises as an interplay of negative hermeneutical injustices , whereby conceptual tools are lacking (Fricker, 2007), and “positive” hermeneutical injustices , whereby the positive presence of distorting and oppressive concepts defeats or prevents the application of more adequate concepts or narratives (Falbo, 2022). In addition, I address and respond to four objections. The first two objections allow me to identify two necessary conditions under which instances of collective forgetting are morally relevant and thus may count as instances of collective amnesia as an epistemic injustice : they must be partly agential, whether on the part of individuals or structures, and due to hermeneutical marginalization. The last two objections enable me to precisely define the scope of this epistemic injustice.