This paper analyzes the battlefield and progress of the Sokham Fortress battle during the reign of King Jinpyeong of Silla. It also examines Silla’s military mobilization for rescue operations. The battle occurred in the Hamyang region, unfolding in four phases: beginning in western Hamyang (Gijam Fortress), proceeding to Hamyang-eup (Sokham Fortress), and concluding at northern Hamyang (Aengjam Fortress). This battle was one of the three major battles between 554 and 642, representing the largest in scale. Silla dispatched five military units, consisting of two jujeongs(州停) and three dangs(幢) as reinforcement troops. However, the commanders of these units exaggerated the damage from losing their armies and withdrew without engaging in a sing battle. Instead, they constructed six fortresses, including Nojin Fortress. These units were part of Silla’s military strength in 624, and their puzzling decision-making can be related to the low combat capability of the beopdang(法幢) units. Due to the commanders’ decisions, Amak Fortress, Silla’s frontline defense against Baekje, fell without attack(不攻拔城), consequently falling under Baekje’s influence. Furthermore, Sokham Fortress, which served as the command center for frontline defense, was also surrendered to Baekje. As a result, Silla was placed in a defensive position in subsequent conflicts against Baekje. It is presumed that issues concerning the low combat capability of the beopdang were raised during the post-battle settlement process. This situation led to the restructuring of military systems, including nandang(郎幢), and contributed to the decline of the beopdang.
Duk-gi Jung (Thu,) studied this question.