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This analysis examines the rejection of hypothesis-based methods in early modern natural philosophy, focusing on Newton's stance.

February 19, 2026Open Access

The Method of Hypotheses in Early Modern Natural Philosophy

Key Points

This analysis examines the rejection of hypothesis-based methods in early modern natural philosophy, focusing on Newton's stance.
Critically analyzes historical texts of Newton and contemporaries like Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz.
Contrasts the Hypothetico-Deductive method with alternative hypothesis approaches.
Explores the popularity and nuances of inference to the best and only plausible hypothesis.
Newton's rejection of hypothesis-based methods contrasts with their widespread acceptance among his contemporaries.
Inference to the best hypothesis and its stronger version were more nuanced than the Hypothetico-Deductive method.
The analysis suggests this disagreement has significant implications for understanding early modern scientific practices.

Abstract

Abstract Newton famously rejected the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy, in stark contrast to many of his contemporaries, such as Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz, who employed hypothetical methods. This disagreement is often framed as one concerning the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) method, but I argue that this is mistaken. The relevant hypothesis-based methods at issue were what I call inference to the best hypothesis and its stronger version, inference to the only plausible hypothesis. These methods were far more nuanced and plausible than HD, and they enjoyed widespread popularity among early modern thinkers, even among prominent experimental philosophers. Newton rejected them nonetheless.

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