There is a wealth of research on the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Existing research on economic sanctions has, however, centered on investigating how the outcome of sanctions disputes is impacted by exogenous variables related to the political and economic circumstances in the sender and target state. Based on the International Sanctions Termination dataset (IST), the first sanctions dataset to map the inclusion of endogenous sanction-design features in sanctions regimes, this thesis explores how the outcome of sanctions disputes is impacted by a set of variables pertaining to the endogenous design of sanctions. Drawing on bargain- ing theory, I contend that sanctions regimes with (H1) clear termination require- ments, (H2) an oversight institution, and (H3) clear review provisions are more effective, and that sanctions regimes with (H4) an expiry date are less effective. To this end, I investigate the impact of the variables on the outcome of all 245 U.S. sanctions regimes in the IST dataset by conducting a time-series cross-sec- tional analysis. The analysis supports H1 at a statistically significant level, show- ing that clear termination requirements increase the likelihood of sanctions suc- cess, especially newly imposed sanctions. Moreover, the analysis indicates the op- posite of H3 – but not consistently at a statistically significant level – showing that clear review provisions decrease the likelihood of sanctions success. The findings lend no support for H2 and H4 at a statistically significant level.
Oskar Hedman (Thu,) studied this question.