Phenomenology, Information, and the Convergence of Ontic and Epistemic Domains

This paper proposes a phenomenological framework in which consciousness functionsas the domain of convergence between ontic reality (what exists) and epistemicstructure (what is known). Contemporary approaches often treat ontology andepistemology as separable, leaving the role of lived experience under-theorized.Drawing on the philosophy of information, the paper argues that information comprisesnot only physical representations, but also abstract meaning and interpretive rules,which are not themselves governed by physical law. While physical representations aresubject to causal and spatiotemporal constraints, meaning is realized only withinexperience.To articulate this relationship, the paper develops a triadic model distinguishing ontic,epistemic, and phenomenological domains. Within this model, phenomenologicalconsciousness is not treated as an ontologically independent substance or a product ofphysical processes alone, but as the experiential field in which physical reality andabstract meaning are unified as lived understanding. Neural activity is interpreted asmediating, rather than ontologically producing, conscious experience.