Academic freedom is under-protected in international human rights law. In order to remedy the situation, this article proposes, first, to critically assess its existing international human rights law framework; second, to interpret the newly re-discovered human right to science so as to re-ground academic freedom primarily (albeit not exclusively) therein as the “freedom indispensable for scientific research” guaranteed by Article 15(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and, third, to draw various implications for academic freedom's right-holders, duty-bearers and scope. It argues that some of the reasons for academic freedom's neglect in international human rights law lie in what makes the human interest and responsibility in science unique, and hence in the specificities academic freedom shares with the human right to science more generally: first, that right's personal and institutional dimensions and, when personal, its individual and collective nature; second, its amounting to both a freedom and a responsibility; and, third, its equal albeit differentiated application to scientists and non-scientists.
Samantha Besson (Wed,) studied this question.