This study focuses on the argument that greenwashing behavior (GWB) among key stakeholders leads to the degradation of governance networks in large-scale construction projects. Grounded in opportunism theory, a cross-scale computational model is developed by integrating a four-party evolutionary game with differential dynamics to capture the co-evolution of stakeholder strategies and network states. The results indicate that GWB exhibits free-riding and herd-like characteristics, and that governance networks possess a degradation equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis based on 50,000 Monte Carlo simulations shows that the frequency of GWB by subcontractors has the greatest impact on network degradation (sensitivity range: 0 to −0.98), followed by general contractors (0 to −0.38), while the influence of supervisory roles is relatively weaker. In contrast, contractual penalties demonstrate limited effectiveness (sensitivity range: −0.08 to 0.06), whereas reputational loss exerts a stronger inhibitory effect (up to −0.5 during the mid-stage evolution). These findings suggest that contract-based governance alone is insufficient to constrain GWB, thereby challenging the conventional assumption of its effectiveness. The results highlight the necessity of shifting from contract-centric governance toward reputation-based and market-oriented mechanisms to effectively mitigate GWB and enhance the resilience of green construction governance.
Yang et al. (Fri,) studied this question.