ABSTRACT What is the nature of our perception of pictures? Philosophers intrigued by this question, and adopting a naturalistic perspective, have turned to findings from visual neuroscience to answer it. This perspective seeks to address the question within the framework of the Two Visual Systems Model , which provides a specific anatomo‐functional description of how our visual system operates. According to this model, the visual cortex hosts a specific hodological division between a ventral stream, responsible for visual recognition, and a dorsal stream, responsible for the visual guidance of action. A philosophical account of picture perception based on this model is therefore referred to as the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception . Since its inception, this account has evolved in parallel with the advancements in the Two Visual Systems Model itself. This paper surveys the various interpretations under the different formulations of this account and traces their development within the literature of empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science.
Gabriele Ferretti (Fri,) studied this question.