Mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure of product risk information: The roles of observability, product liability, and product-risk correlation

We compare incentives to acquire product-risk information under Cournot competition with product liability and correlated risks. Disclosure regimes are indexed by the probability that acquired information is discretionary rather than compulsory, so mandatory and voluntary disclosure are polar cases. Strategic concealment creates an opacity feedback: when acquisition effort is observable, higher effort changes how the market interprets silence. This can reduce acquisition incentives and overturn the standard acquisition-incentive ranking. We also identify a neutrality locus where market beliefs are payoff-irrelevant and acquisition incentives reflect only the output-adjustment value of information. • Disclosure regimes form a continuum between mandatory and voluntary rules. • Observable learning effort creates an opacity feedback from silence. • Opacity feedback can reduce incentives to acquire product-risk information. • Voluntary disclosure can induce less learning than mandatory disclosure. • A neutrality locus makes market beliefs payoff-irrelevant.