ABSTRACT The exploration of collaborative governance strategies for trusted data spaces in marine ranching is pivotal for establishing a sustainable and resilient marine fishery industry chain. Based on the institutional collective action (ICA) framework, this paper constructs a three‐party stochastic evolutionary game model involving chain‐leading enterprises, participating enterprises and local governments, to examine how collective action factors influence the strategic evolution of participants. The results indicate (1) under random disturbances, all three actors tend to adopt proactive strategies in the initial allocation state. (2) The willingness of each party to participate in collaborative governance is negatively associated with action costs and positively with collective action benefits. (3) Synergistic effect coefficients and synergistic relational capital strengthen participants' willingness, with the magnitude ranked as participating enterprises > local governments > chain‐leading enterprises. (4) While participating enterprises are less sensitive to institutional reputation losses, other reward‐and‐punishment interventions significantly shape the strategies of all parties. This study validates the feasibility of the ‘chain‐leader driven + multi‐party collaboration’ governance framework for trusted data spaces in marine ranching, providing theoretical support and policy implications for advancing the modernization of marine fishery and the digital transformation of the marine industry.
Wang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.