Americans’ Attitudes toward War: Trend Analysis of Public Opinion for the Iraq War

Abstract This article presents the results of an analysis of public attitudes toward war for the contemporary Iraq War. In total, 23 surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization starting March 2003 and ending in February 2006 were analyzed. This article examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to oppose war. The research reported here was arrived at answering the following question: Are there some groups (e.g., women) who are more likely to oppose the war? Using binary logistic regression methods, this research analyzes why some groups are more likely than others to oppose or support war. This cross-sectional analysis studies groups by age, education, gender, race, religion, party identification, and political ideology, in their general likelihood to oppose war. Several traditional expectations on war attitudes, including a "gender gap" and an "education gap," were unfounded. In some cases where correlations were found, the relationship could be explained predominately by the correlation of demographic characteristics with partisanship. This study has demonstrated just how much more powerful party identification has become in the United States. This trend analysis is the closest look at U.S. public opinion on war since the groundbreaking and prize-winning work of John CitationMueller (1973). KEYWORDS: Warpublic opinionpollingterrorism We thank the Gallup Poll Organization for use of the data. Computation was carried out using facilities of the Department of Sociology, Stony Brook University. Notes 1. http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm 2. We thank Bowen and Bok (1998) for their excellent explanation of adjusted probabilities. 3. This section is based on Pindyck and Rubinfield (1991, pp. 258–261). 4. This is the question seen in Gallup polls measuring political party, "In politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat or an Independent?" 5. This is the question seen in the Iraq war Gallup polls measuring political ideology as a self-described measure, "How would you describe your political views? (1) Very conservative, (2) Conservative, (3) Moderate, (4) Liberal, or (5) Very liberal." 6. When asking the question about a respondent's race in the Iraq War, Gallup asked if one was "White," "African-American," and for the first time "other Race" was broken down by asking if respondents were "Hispanic," "Asian," or "Other." For the Persian Gulf, Vietnam, and Korean wars the racial categories were only "whites," "blacks," or "other race." 7. http://www.thestate.com/sc-at-war/story/319567.html 8. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=980CE5D91431F93BA3575BC0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all 9. The data results for African Americans whom identify themselves as Republicans are not very meaningful because very few African Americans align themselves with that party. 10. CitationLunch & Sperlich (1979) provide a number of detailed explanations, by social scientists, on why young people are typically more pro war than older generations. Sociologists would say that younger people, being closer to patriotic indoctrination in the schools, would be more likely to respond aggressively in a war situation than their elders. An anthropologist could note that the American youth culture (especially among boys) emphasizes aggressiveness, competitiveness, courageousness, excitement, and adventure—and all these elements have been present in popular presentations of war on television, in the cinema, and in journalistic accounts. Historians might argue that older people have had more negative experiences with war. As a result of older people experiencing at least one World War and/or Korea, they might be more familiar than younger people with the terrors and deprivations war imposes. 11. One would come to expect a difference since young persons are more likely to be better educated (a similar argument presented by CitationMueller, 1973). 12. This is the question seen in Gallup polls measuring education, "What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?" Education is partially a surrogate for social class, since the better educated are generally financially better off as well (CitationMueller, 1973). The education variable is more stable and easier to work with—in contrast to dealing with occupation or income, which vary considerably over time as economic conditions waver (CitationMueller, 1973). Mueller favors the use of the education variable over income because the classification systems used by the polling agencies have been consistent when handling the education variable. One of the downsides of using education is that the average educational attainment between the wars had risen considerably, therefore, the sample size drawing lower-educated citizens has reduced considerably. Also, since the older generation tends to be less educated, the attitudes of the better educated may disproportionately be the voices of those of the younger generation. 13. This is the question seen in Gallup polls measuring religious preference, "What, if any, is your religious preference—are you Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Muslim, or an Orthodox religion such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?" 14. The questions measuring hawk/dove, for the most part, were not self-selected (when respondents identify themselves as hawk/dove) in all the wars. How respondents answered hawk/dove questions on the surveys measured a respondent's position on the hawk/dove scale. For example, a type of hawk or dove question from the Iraq War on October 28–30, 2005, "Which comes closest to your view about what the U.S. should now do about the number of U.S. troops in Iraq? (1) The U.S. should send more troops to Iraq, (2) The U.S. should keep the number of troops as it is now, (3) The U.S. should withdraw some troops from Iraq, (4) The U.S. should withdraw all of its troops from Iraq, (5) DON'T KNOW, (6) REFUSED" (see Appendix A for additional questions measuring hawk or dove attitudes). The responses to this survey question were taken, and a respondent's degree of hawkishness/dovishness was determined (by taking the average of the responses if there were multiple questions in a survey) for each of the wars. 15. Doves and pessimists are more likely to oppose the Iraq War. Thus, if Democrats are more likely to be doves and pessimists than are Republicans, and both doves and pessimists are more likely to oppose the Iraq War, the opposition rates of Democrats will be higher than Republicans. It is desirable to "adjust" opposition rates to control for this fact. When we compare adjusted rates for Democrats and Republicans, we are able to analyze outcomes for the two groups on the assumption that they are equivalent in all respects except for their political party affiliation. 16. See Note 15.