Classical deterrence theory generally treats coercion as a problem of threshold management, in which deterrence succeeds when an adversary is dissuaded from overt aggression. Yet contemporary grey-zone competition increasingly proceeds through cumulative, ambiguous, and sub-threshold forms of coercion that do not fit this model easily. This article develops the concept of deterrence bypass to explain how strong but incomplete high-end deterrent constraint may redirect coercive pressure into domains where retaliation is harder to coordinate and sustain. It argues that under such conditions, deterrence is better understood as a process of temporal competition over functional authority rather than as the simple prevention of discrete attack. Escalation is therefore reconceptualized not only as force intensification but also as gradual degradation in operational control, institutional autonomy, and confidence in state capacity. The article is theory-building rather than theory-testing and uses the Taiwan Strait as a plausibility probe to examine whether this framework helps explain sustained grey-zone coercion under conditions of substantial escalation risk. In doing so, it advances a processual account of deterrence that links high-end deterrent constraint, sub-threshold displacement, temporal normalization, and the erosion or defence of effective authority in protracted strategic rivalry.
Ji-Jen Hwang (Mon,) studied this question.