Evolution of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game Strategies in Structured Demes Under Random Pairing in Game Playing

We discuss the evolution of strategies in a spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game in which each player is located in a cell of a two-dimensional grid-world. Following the concept of structured demes, two neighborhood structures are used. One is for the interaction among players through the IPD game. A player in each cell plays against its neighbors defined by this neighborhood structure. The other is for mating strategies by genetic operations. A new strategy for a player is generated by genetic operations from a pair of parent strings, which are selected from its neighboring cells defined by the second neighborhood structure. After examining the effect of the two neighborhood structures on the evolution of cooperative behavior with standard pairing in game-playing, we introduce a random pairing scheme in which each player plays against a different randomly chosen neighbor at every round (i.e., every iteration) of the game. Through computer simulations, we demonstrate that small neighborhood structures facilitate the evolution of cooperative behavior under random pairing in game-playing.