Public sector performance auditing in a political hegemony: A case study of Indonesia

Abstract Debate over public‐sector auditors’ independence has focused largely on Western developed democracies. Drawing on Gramsci's theory of hegemony, this study explores how the political hegemony and ideology influence public‐sector auditors’ independence and audit quality in a developing country, Indonesia. In contrast to the widely accepted belief that public‐sector auditors’ independence is guaranteed by the legislature, this study argues that active intervention by the political hegemony undermines this independence and thus impairs audit quality. The study's document analysis and in‐depth interviews conducted with technical controllers, supervisors and investigators at the Supreme Audit Institution in Indonesia reveal that the political hegemony and ideology influence auditors’ cognition. This study enhances understanding of how the political hegemony, supported by the imperium, ruling‐class psychology and spheres of influence, substantially erodes auditors’ constitutive role, giving rise to concerns about value for taxpayers’ money and public‐sector effectiveness and efficiency.