A prime example of coopetition in the transportation sector is rental car agencies leasing underutilised fleet vehicles to freelance drivers who provide service through peer-to-peer (P2P) ride-hailing platforms. We adopt and analyse a classic sequential game-theoretic model in which the ride-hailing platform serves as a two-sided market connecting service providers and consumers (riders), while the rental car agency offers leasing contracts to both retail consumers (renters) and latent ride-hailing providers. Existing operations management literature has offered a limited examination of coopetition between two-sided markets with respect to service wait-time sensitivity and capacity constraints on leasing services. We analyse both service wait times and the own-versus-lease decision of heterogeneous providers on the ride-hailing platform to show how coopetition affects all participants in the equilibrium. When high vehicle acquisition costs constrain service capacity, adding ride-hailing providers does not necessarily reduce pre-service wait times. Under coopetition, fares may even rise, potentially harming consumers. On the other hand, even in a market with high service capacity, adding freelance providers through coopetition could still benefit consumers. We also investigate the impact of coopetition on consumer loyalty to suggest when the regulatory authority should encourage or disallow such a collaboration.
Jhang‐Li et al. (Fri,) studied this question.