Purpose This study investigates the critical question of why the Iranian Parliament has not adopted and institutionalizing established mechanisms for public participation in its legislative process. Design/methodology/approach Employing a qualitative inductive research design, this study conducted 23 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with key stakeholders directly involved in the legislative process. The data collected was subjected to a rigorous qualitative content analysis to identify emergent themes and patterns. Findings The analysis uncovered a complex typology of legislative inaction, which can be categorized into five themes: (1) Calculated inaction, driven by a desire to preserve legislative power and the perception that lawmaking is too technically complex for public input; (2) Ideological inaction, stemming from a paternalistic governance ethos and a commitment to safeguarding revolutionary values from perceived deviation; (3) Imposed inaction, where external factors such as restrictive parliamentary regulations and influential media narratives enforce exclusivity; (4) Reluctant inaction, arising from systemic deficiencies including a lack of public demand, weak institutional incentives, and infrastructural constraints; and (5) Inadvertent inaction, sustained by cognitive biases, risk aversion, and unconscious institutional habits among legislators. Originality/value This research proposes a comprehensive framework for understanding the phenomenon of legislative inaction in public participation. With Iran’s unique political-ideological landscape, characterized by the principle of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the study contributes to debates on participatory democracy and offers evidence-based insights for designing context-sensitive parliamentary reforms.
Danaeefard et al. (Sat,) studied this question.